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We describe the unusual spread of a penicillin-susceptible methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA) clone in hospitals in western Switzerland, where the incidence of MRSA
is usually low. During a 2-year period, this clone had been responsible for several outbreaks
and had been isolated from 1156 persons in 21 institutions. Molecular typing by pulsed-field
gel electrophoresis (PFGE) demonstrated that all of these isolates belonged to the same clone.
In 1 of the outbreaks, involving 30 cases, the clone was responsible for at least 17 secondary
cases. In contrast, during the period of the latter outbreak, 9 other patients harboring different
MRSA strains, as assessed by PFGE, were hospitalized in the same wards, but no secondary
cases occurred. These observations suggest that this clone, compared with other MRSA
strains, had some intrinsic factor(s) that contributed to its ability to disseminate and could
thus be considered epidemic.
During the past 15 years, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) has become an increasing cause of hospital
infections around the world. In the early 1980s, a single strain
of MRSA, characterized by phage typing, caused outbreaks in
several hospitals in England and Wales [1, 2]. This strain was
called epidemic (EMRSA), to distinguish it from strains that
did not cause outbreaks. Since then, other epidemic strains
in several countries of Europe and in Australia have been
described.
EMRSA strains were mainly acquired by intensive care pa-
tients and tended to be multiresistant to antibiotics. These
strains have usually been defined as epidemic only because they
were detected simultaneously in several hospitals. It is postu-
lated that some intrinsic factors, such as those involved in the
colonization of the host or in the ability of the strain to survive
in the environment, are responsible for this “epidemic behavior”
[2]. However, there are also extrinsic factors that may contribute
to the ability of a microorganism to disseminate, such as the
characteristics of the source or recipient patients or control
measures implemented against MRSA.
We describe in this report the unusual spread of an MRSA
clone in a small geographic area, the western part of Switzer-
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land, where a low rate of MRSA was observed during several
years of surveillance and control [3–5], except in a Geneva
hospital [6]. In addition, we analyzed in more detail the epi-
demiology of the outbreak that occurred in 1 hospital, with a
particular focus on extrinsic factors.
Methods
General setting. The hospitals involved in the present study
are located in the western part of Switzerland, an area of ∼1.5
million inhabitants. The university hospital of Lausanne serves as
the tertiary-care center for most of the region, except Geneva,
which is not included in the present study. The MRSA surveillance
program was part of a larger surveillance project in Switzerland.
Surveillance and control strategies. Patients with MRSA were
usually identified by surveillance of microbiological laboratory data
from clinical specimens. Some were also identified by surveillance
cultures of specimens obtained from patients who had been room-
mates of those infected or colonized with MRSA. When a cluster
was suspected, patients of the ward, as well as staff members, were
also screened [3].
In addition, at the university hospital of Lausanne, surveillance
cultures were performed at the time of admission, when patients
who were known to have been positive for MRSA were readmitted
and when patients were transferred from hospitals outside the area.
Surveillance culture specimens included swabs of anterior nares,
throat, inguinoperineal areas, infected sites, or open wounds.
Outbreak investigation at the university hospital of Lausanne.
For each patient, the following data were collected: demographic
data, geographic origin, dates of admission and discharge, location
and transfer within the hospital, previous hospitalization, history
concerning MRSA, underlying diagnosis, and risk factors for
MRSA colonization/infection and dissemination (table 1).
Microbiology. Identification of S. aureus was done by standard
methods. Susceptibility testing was performed by disk diffusion on
Mueller-Hinton agar with 24-h incubation at 357C. Interpretation
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Table 1. Univariate analysis of potential factors for dissemination of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in patients harboring epidemic strain
(EMRSA) vs. nonepidemic strains.
Factor
Patients with
EMRSA
Patients with
other strains OR (95% CI) Pa
On admission
Indwelling urinary catheter 3/29 (10) 2/9 (22) 0.40 (0.06–2.90) NS
Wound, decubitus ulcer 19/28 (67) 7/9 (78) 0.60 (0.10–3.51) NS
Antibiotic therapy 8/25 (32) 2/7 (28) 1.18 (0.19–7.42) NS
During hospitalization (before
MRSA detected)
Indwelling catheterb 28/30 (93) 8/9 (89) — NS
Operation 20/29 (69) 6/9 (67) 1.11 (0.23–5.47) NS
Wound, decubitus ulcer 27/30 (90) 6/9 (67) 4.50 (0.72–28.0) NS
Antibiotic treatment 25/30 (83) 6/9 (67) 2.50 (0.46–13.5) NS
No. of roommates 3 5 1.7 1.7 5 1.3 .01
No. of hospital daysc 23 5 23 4.6 5 11 .027
MRSA infection 6/30 (20) 5/8 (62) 0.15 (0.03–0.81) .03
NOTE. Data are either no. (%) of patients with factor/total no. of patients or mean 5
.SD
a Fisher’s exact test (two-tailed) or Wilcoxon’s two-sample test.
b Permanent iv catheter, central venous catheter, arterial catheter, peripheral catheter, in-
dwelling urinary catheter, intubation, or drains.
c Between admission (or the last negative screening for MRSA) and MRSA detection.
criteria were from the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory
Standards [7]. Resistance to oxacillin was confirmed by the screen
agar test [8] and, on several occasions, by amplification of the mecA
gene. Chromogenic nitrocefin disks (Cefinase; BBL Becton Dick-
inson, Cockeysville, MD) were used to test the phenotypic ex-
pression of b-lactamase.
Molecular typing was performed with pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE). Plugs of genomic DNA were obtained, as de-
scribed elsewhere [9, 10] and digested with SmaI according to the
manufacturer’s recommendations. Electrophoresis was performed
with use of the CHEF DR III system (BioRad, Hercules, CA); the
conditions were 6 V/cm for 24 h at 127C, with linear pulsed times
of 1–45 s. l ladder (50 kb) (New England Biolabs, Beverly, MA)
was used as the molecular size standard.
The banding patterns of the different gels were analyzed with
the software GelCompar (Applied Maths, Ghent, Belgium). At
least 1 isolate per antibiotype and per patient was typed by PFGE.
Details of the antibiogram typing method and its epidemiological
value have been described elsewhere [4, 11]. The epidemic clone
was defined as all isolates showing an indistinguishable PFGE pat-
tern and all isolates showing patterns related (with 1- to 6-band
differences) to that of the major strain [12, 13].
Population analysis profile. The phenotypic expression of b-
lactam resistance in vitro was determined, as described elsewhere
[14]. In brief, different dilutions of a suspension of the test strain
were spread onto agar plates containing 2-fold serial dilutions of
methicillin, amoxicillin, or the combination of amoxicillin and the
penicillinase inhibitor clavulanate. The population-analysis-profile
curves were generated by plotting the number of colonies growing
on the plates against the concentrations of the antibiotic in the
plates. The well-described strain P8 [14], which is penicillinase-
producing and expresses heterogeneous resistance to methicillin,
was used as a control.
Experimental endocarditis in rats. The pathogenic potential of
the test strain was investigated in the rat model of endocarditis, as
described elsewhere [14]. In brief, catheter-induced aortic vegeta-
tions were produced in rats. Groups of rats were inoculated with
saline containing different inocula (102–106 cfu) of the test strain.
These titration experiments allowed determination of the minimum
inoculum of this organism required to infect 50% (ID50) and 90%
(ID90) of the rats. The animals were killed 24 h after inoculation,
and quantitative cultures of the aortic vegetations were performed.
Results
Outbreaks in hospitals of western Switzerland. From Jan-
uary 1996 to December 1997, an increasing number of patients
colonized/infected with a unique clone of MRSA was noted in
western Switzerland. The relatedness between MRSA isolates
was investigated by means of PFGE typing. Of 250 MRSA
isolates (1 per patient) analyzed, 142 were indistinguishable and
14 had a related pattern (figure 1). This clone was responsible
for several outbreaks in different hospitals and had been iso-
lated from at least 136 patients and 20 staff members at 21
hospitals or nursing homes (figure 2).
This epidemic clone had been previously isolated only once,
during an outbreak in May 1995 involving 1 institution, where
8 of the 14 related isolates were recovered. This suggests that
the epidemic may have started in this area. Additional criteria
supporting the clonal origin of these isolates were heterogenous
resistance to methicillin and phenotypic susceptibility to most
other antibiotics, including penicillin.
The clone was compared with other epidemic MRSA strains
from Europe and other countries (Belgium clones 1, 2, and 3
[15]; Poland clones A4, A9, and B16 [16, 17]; Iberian clone
I::E::A [18]; Hungarian clone III::B::A [19]; German clones [20];
United Kingdom clones EMRSA 15 and 16 [21]; and Canadian
clone OE MRSA [22]). It was found to be indistinguishable
from the Belgium epidemic clone 2, which was responsible in
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Figure 1. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis restriction patterns of
SmaI-digested DNA of western Switzerland epidemic clone of methi-
cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (lane 7, major pattern;
lanes 1–6, examples of related patterns) and of European and Canadian
epidemic clones (lane 8, Belgium clone 2; lane 9, Canadian clone OE;
lane 10, Berlin clone; lane 11, UK EMRSA [epidemic methicillin-re-
sistant S. aureus] 15; lane 12, south Germany clone; lane 13, Poland
clone A9; lane 14, Poland clone A4; lane 15, Hungary clone III::B::A;
lane 16, Hanover (Germany) clone; lane 17, southeast Germany clone;
lane 18, Hanover clone; lane 19, Belgium clone 3; lane 20, Vienna
clone; lane 21, Poland clone B16; lane 22, Iberian clone I::E::A; lane
23, north Germany clone; lane 24, Belgium clone 1; and lane 25, UK
EMRSA 16). M, molecular weight marker (l ladder).
1995 for 15% of MRSA isolated in Belgium [23], and was re-
lated to the OE MRSA clone, which was responsible for a large
epidemic in 1996 in Ontario, Canada [22] (figure 1).
During the same period of surveillance, January 1996 to De-
cember 1997, 50 other MRSA strains were recovered from 94
patients (data not shown). Thirty-eight strains were unique,
whereas 12 were recovered from 11 patient (2–12 patients each).
With regard to transmission within hospitals, 10 clusters of only
2–7 patients were recovered. These results suggest that the
MRSA strains not related to the epidemic clone had limited
spreading within western Switzerland and within hospitals.
Outbreak at the university hospital of Lausanne. The out-
break started in February 1996 in the septic surgery, trauma-
tology and rheumatology wards and involved 30 patients and
8 staff members (figure 3). During the same period, genetically
different MRSA strains were isolated from 9 patients hospi-
talized in the same wards. All of these other strains were de-
tected either in clinical specimens or by screening on admission.
On 4 occasions all patients of the wards were screened for
MRSA, and 6 of 145 screenings were positive for MRSA; all
isolates were of the epidemic clone. Staff members were also
screened on 5 occasions, and of the 230 screenings, 9 were
positive; 8 isolates were of the epidemic clone. Analysis of ep-
idemiological data showed that at least 17 of 30 patients har-
boring the epidemic clone were secondary cases (nosocomial
cases; figure 3). No secondary cases were observed with the
other strains, except for 1 case involving a staff member who
probably acquired the strain from a patient.
Extrinsic factors that might have contributed to the spread
of MRSA were compared between the patients harboring the
epidemic clone and patients harboring genetically different
strains. The same infection control practices were applied for
all patients during the whole period [3]: contact isolation during
the period of carriage/infection, decontamination protocol for
7 days (including daily body-washing with chlorhexidine soap,
intranasal mupirocin twice a day, and oral antibiotics [co-
trimoxazole and rifampin]). Isolation was discontinued when
surveillance cultures were negative on 2 occasions, 2 days apart.
A comparative analysis of risk factors for acquisition of ep-
idemic versus nonepidemic strains of MRSA during hospital-
ization was not possible, since no secondary case occurred in
the group of patients with nonepidemic strains. Factors that
may play a role in MRSA dissemination were compared be-
tween patients harboring the epidemic clone and patients har-
boring the other strains (table 1). The results show that there
were more infected versus colonized patients in the group with
nonepidemic strains (5 of 8 vs. 6 of 30). They also show that
the number of roommates and the duration of hospitalization
before detection of MRSA were significantly greater for pa-
tients harboring the epidemic clone than for patients harboring
the other strains.
Additional characteristics of the epidemic clone. Use of the
disk-diffusion method showed that isolates of the clone were
susceptible to penicillin, augmentin, cephalothin, cefepime, clin-
damycin, co-trimoxazole, erythromycin, fusidic acid, genta-
micin, rifampin, and vancomycin; and were resistant to cip-
rofloxacin and ceftriaxone. The presence of the mecA gene was
confirmed by PCR on several isolates.
The absence of b-lactamase was suggested by the chromo-
genic nitrocefin disk test, performed on several isolates. This
was confirmed by the population analysis profile of 1 isolate
(figure 4). The epidemic isolate and the strain P8, used as a
control, expressed heterogeneous resistance to methicillin and
contained subpopulations of bacteria able to grow on plates
CID 1999;29 (December) MRSA in an Area of Low Incidence 1515
Figure 2. Geographic localization of the 21 hospitals or nursing homes (v) in western Switzerland from which epidemic clone of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus was isolated during period January 1996 to December 1997 (no. in circles indicates no. of persons with epidemic
clone in each particular institution).
containing methicillin (1125 mg/L). Both strains also expressed
a phenotype susceptible to amoxicillin in the presence of cla-
vulanate. However, when plated on amoxicillin alone, the P8
strain was homogeneously resistant to the drug because of its
degradation by penicillinase, whereas the susceptibility of the
epidemic isolate was not altered. These results indicate that the
epidemic isolate did not produce penicillinase.
The pathogenicity of 1 isolate of the epidemic clone was
evaluated in the experimental model of endocarditis in rats.
The minimum inocula infecting 50% and 90% of animals were
103 cfu and 104 cfu, respectively. These results were similar to
those for several nonepidemic strains [14], a finding suggesting
that the epidemic isolate was not more pathogenic than other
S. aureus strains.
Discussion
Epidemic MRSA strains were first described by investigators
in England [1, 2, 24–26]. Since then, investigators in many other
countries have reported the occurrence of the predominant
spread of 1 strain in a defined geographic area (Germany [27,
28], Poland [16], Turkey [29], Portugal and Spain [18, 30, 31],
Holland [32], and Australia [33]).
Most of the work describing epidemic strains of MRSA has
been done in England, where investigators’ “...experiences sup-
port the contention that some MRSA are truly epidemic, whilst
others do not behave in this manner...” [2]. However, in general,
a detailed analysis of extrinsic factors that might have influ-
enced spread of the strains has not been conducted. A simplified
approach was used in a Dutch study [32] and showed that, in
the same setting, other MRSA strains did not spread to others
patients, in contrast with the epidemic strain. However, in that
study, the different patients were not hospitalized at the same
time.
Many results from the present study suggest that extrinsic
factors did not play a major role in the spreading of the epi-
demic MRSA clone. First, the clone spread rapidly in western
Switzerland, a situation that had not been observed with other
MRSA strains in this geographic area, where the incidence is
low and where no recent changes had occurred in the health
care delivery system. Second, during the investigated outbreak,
the populations of patients prone to acquire MRSA from pa-
tients colonized/infected with the epidemic clone versus from
Figure 3. Outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection in septic surgery, traumatology, and rheumatology wards
of university hospital in Lausanne. Column 1 indicates patient’s no. Columns 2 and 3 indicate origin or time of detection of MRSA. AD, admission;
AS, admission screening; C, clinical specimens; NC, nosocomial (MRSA detected during hospitalization for patients who had no record of previous
carriage of or infection with MRSA and had multiple negative clinical or screening samples before MRSA detection); NC?, same as NC, but no
microbiology specimen was obtained before detection of MRSA; RS, roommate screening; WS, ward screening; pos, positive.
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Figure 4. Population analysis profile of 1 isolate of epidemic clone
(A) of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and of control strain
P8 (B). Various sizes of bacterial inocula were spread on agar plates
containing increasing concentrations of methicillin (m), amoxicillin (m),
or amoxicillin/clavulanate (v).
patients with other strains were similar, but no secondary case
occurred from the group of patients with nonepidemic strains.
Third, the control measures were identical for all patients
colonized or infected with MRSA during the period of the
outbreak. Fourth, the clone was recognized as epidemic in 2
other countries (Belgium [15] and Canada [22]). However, when
detailed epidemiological data of the outbreak at our hospital
were analyzed, it was found that the period of hospitalization
before MRSA detection and the number of roommates were
greater for patients with the epidemic clone than for patients
with the other strains. This could explain why there were more
secondary cases in the former group.
However, the duration of hospitalization before the detection
of MRSA was an overestimation of the duration of unrecog-
nized carriage, since the date of nosocomial acquisition was
not known. The shorter periods of contact in the nonepidemic
group could also be due to the fact that, in this group, there
were more patients infected with MRSA and that most of these
infections were detected on admission (admission screening,
figure 3); thus they were recognized at an earlier stage. Even
though these 2 factors might partly account for the differences
between epidemic and nonepidemic strains, however, they are
unlikely to entirely account for the magnitude of the whole
epidemic in the geographic area, and it is likely that some
MRSA intrinsic factors also favored the spread of this partic-
ular epidemic clone.
Multiresistance to antimicrobial agents and higher patho-
genicity do not appear to account for these intrinsic factors,
since the clone was susceptible to most antibiotics tested, in-
cluding penicillin, and was not found to be more pathogenic
than other S. aureus strains in the rat model of experimental
endocarditis.
The present study provides additional evidence that some
intrinsic factors may play a role in the epidemic behavior of
some MRSA strains. Since early recognition of an epidemic
strain may trigger more vigorous preventive measures that are
yet to be precisely defined, the need is urgent for an easy and
quick means to recognize epidemic MRSA. Further studies
should be done in this field, which could involve either the
detection of a genetic element responsible for the epidemicity
or the setup of an international database containing the pat-
terns of all recognized epidemic clones, with use of a stan-
dardized molecular typing system.
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